This study employs four-dimensional (firm-product-destination-year) export data of Brazilian firms to analyze firm-level responses when faced with an antidumping protection in a particular export market. We examine the extent to which firms shift their exports to other destinations in response to the antidumping duties. Our findings suggest that trade deflection depends on past export status in export markets. Firms deflect trade but only to destinations where they already have an established trading relationship. This prior relationship is important both for the intensive as well as for the extensive margin of trade alternative destinations. In addition to making sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection, this paper makes an important contribution by demonstrating how much the fixed costs of developing an export destination matter in terms of trade deflection.
the past trading relationships matter to deflect trade for the firms whose products are targeted by AD measures. In this regard, our rich dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore the variation in exports within firms across different destinations when there is a change in trade barrier for a particular product in an export destination.
To date, there are too few studies in the AD literature using firm-level data. Konings and Vandenbussche (henceforth KV) ( 2008) estimate the effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic importcompeting firms in the EU. Belderbos (1997) illustrates the relationship between EU and US antidumping measures and foreign direct investment through a micro-econometrical analysis of Japanese firms' plant establishments in the electronics industry. In a noticeably detailed analysis, Pierce (2011) investigates the plant-level responses to AD measures for the protected plants in the US. Avsar (2013) examines the pricing effect of AD duties and the exporters' response to a threat of retaliation stemming from domestic AD actions. KV (2013) and Lu et al. (2013) remain the only firm-level studies of AD policy to analyze the value of export sales and the extensive margin of exports.
Although related, our paper conceptually distinguishes from KV (2013) by the fact that their study focuses on the effect of France's AD duties on the exports of the domestic protected firms, whereas this paper analyzes the effect of AD duties, which targets the exporters in the international market. In addition, they exploit a three-dimensional panel, which does not differentiate the product categories for the firms that export multiple products. Whereas, with a four-dimensional panel data for firm, product and destinations, the empirical analysis carried out in this paper is a significant improvement over the previous studies that investigate the trading effects of AD measures.
It should be highlighted that AD duties provide a useful way of examining trade deflection. Antidumping duties yield substantial changes in trade flows given the fact that they are on average 10 to 20 times higher than the most favored nation (MFN) tariffs. 4 Besides, AD duty is a product and a market specific trading cost for a firm. For example, if Mexican AD agencies impose an AD duty on Brazilian cotton shirt exporters, neither the other textile shirt exporters of Brazil nor the cotton shirt exporters of Argentina will be affected by this discriminatory policy adjustment. Hence, if a firm sells multiple products to a destination, it is obliged to pay AD duties only for the particular product which is targeted by the importer country. Since our analysis is based on the attractive source of variation in the value of exports within firm-product combinations across export destinations, these product-specific shocks for the firms in different export markets perfectly fits our research question.
Alongside this, Brazil is a well-suited country for such an analysis for several reasons. First, highly disaggregated firm-level data of Brazilian exports makes Brazil an outstanding case for this research. Second, Brazilian exported products were frequently targeted by AD duty over the period of our sample. There are 51 AD cases filed against Brazil in this period, 40 of which resulted in rulings against Brazil. Moreover, these affirmative cases correspond to 120 unique six-digit HS products. Finally, countries that imposed AD duty on Brazilian exported products account for almost 50 % of the Brazil's total exports over the sample. This allows us to expect a dramatic impact of AD duties imposed by these countries on the trade flows of Brazilian firms to third countries. Table 1 documents the products subject to AD duties and the duty imposing countries between 1994 and 2000. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: firms only deflect exports to countries where they have an already established trading relationship. In particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export to alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive margin, our findings suggest that firms' probability of exporting the duty imposed product to a different market increases only if they have already an established trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD duties on the firms' probability of exporting the particular product in different export destinations that the firm did not serve before.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data; Section 3 discusses the motivation of our empirical strategy and the formal econometric methodology. In Section 4, we document the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
Export data comes from the Brazilian customs' office SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior) which documents exports by product code at the plant, month and NCM (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul) level. The NCM codes are 8-digit numbers, of which the first six digits coincide with the first six digits in the Harmonized System. The destination information is mapped from Brazilian country codes into the international ISO system. The product codes at the 6-digit level in the Brazilian data, for which there exists no corresponding Harmonized System entries, are removed from the data. All export values in the SECEX data are reported in current U.S. dollars (USD), free on board (fob). We utilize observations for the years between 1994 and 2000. 5 The employment data of Brazilian firms are obtained from the collection of annual reports with individual information on workers and employees, which is called RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais). Similar to our treatment of the export data, we aggregate the monthly worker-plant information to years and firms.
Finally, the data on AD is obtained from Global Antidumping Database of the World Bank. 6 This database provides detailed product level information on the AD petitions such as the initiation date, the decision date, the targeted country, and the final decision of the AD authority as well as the HS codes of the products subject to filings.
The Empirical Investigation

The Classification of Firm-product Combinations
We are particularly interested in the effect of AD duties on the exporting firms' sales in third markets (intensive margin) and on the probability of exporting the duty imposed product to alternative destinations (extensive margin). Suppose that country i impose an AD duty on Brazilian exporters of product p. As shown in Figure 1 , there are three types of firms at the time of duty imposition which are affected by this AD measure:
-Type 1 firms, which were exporting product p to country i and non-exporter in country h.
-Type 2 firms, which were exporting product p to country i but exporting another product to country h.
-Type 3 firms, which were exporting product p both to i and h. In order to deflect its trade to country h, type 1 firm, which did not export to country h before, has to incur the market specific start-up costs such as learning the bureaucratic procedures of exporting to country h and product-market specific start-up costs such as adapting the particular product in country h. However, type 2 firm does not have to incur the market specific start-up cost in a similar scenario, given the fact that it has already served country h before. When it comes to the type 3 firm, which has an ongoing trading relationship for good X in both countries, there is no need to pay any start-up cost. Intuitively, deflecting trade to its trading partner for the type 3 firm is as easy as a couple of more phone calls compared to the type 1 firm which must undertake the cost of entering to a new country, contacting potential customers and establishing necessary distribution channels to sell its product. On the other hand, type 2 firm has a comparative advantage over type 1 firm in terms of market specific start-up costs such as learning the bureaucratic procedures to export to country h.
To examine whether this difference in trading relationships affect trade deflection, we constructed a panel for the firm-product-country triplets in which the firm-products are those which were the target of an AD duty at least once over the sample and the countries are the top 40 export destinations of Brazil. Second, we created a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if there is an AD duty in force targeting the particular firm-product combination in a country other than the country of the unit observation. 7 Finally, in order to identify the effect of previous trading relationships, we used three different dummies for the three types of past export status described above. 8 More specifically, each AD duty imposed in an export market creates the three country case mentioned above for Brazil, the duty imposer country and the destination country of the unit observation.
To better understand the construction of the data, a representative case is illustrated in Table 2 . Consider a firm which was exporting steel connector to Mexico which imposed AD duty to Brazil for that product in 1996. As shown, a four-dimensional panel in which the destinations are the top 40 export markets of Brazil is constructed. The AD dummy is unity for steel connectors in non-Mexican destinations to identify the effect of the imposed AD duty by Mexico. 9 Second, each firm-product combination is classified per their past export status in the particular country. For instance, this firm was a non-exporter in Argentina, exporter of steel connectors in Chile and exporter of another product in the USA in the previous 3 years. Each firm-product-destination is unity only for one of the past export status (Type 1/2/3). The interaction of the AD variable and the past export status captures the effect of the Mexican AD duty for these different categories. The same methodology is followed for every year in which the AD duty is in force. 10 Since the exporting status might change in the following years, the values for the Type 1/2/3 dummy might do so as well. If the firm is an exporter of another product (let say ferro-silico manganese), then the same panel is constructed for that product and the AD dummy takes a value of 0 in that portion of the data. As shown in Table 4 , the AD dummy takes on a value of 1 for the 41 % of the sample. It should be noted that this number does not show the percentage of firm-product combinations that faced AD duty; rather it shows the percentage of export destinations in which the increase in trade (in both margins) might be resulting from an AD duty in another market. Similarly, the means of the interaction terms (AD x Type 1/2/3) show the percentage of relevant trading relationships for the particular export destination. 
Intensive Margin of Trade Defllection
We start our empirical exercise by estimating the following equation:
where f denotes a firm, p denotes a six-digit HS product, i and h denote export destinations, t denotes time in years between 1994 and 2000. The variable ( )denotes the value of exports, ( ℎ ) is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the particular firm-product combination is hit with an AD duty in an export destination except country i .
11 ( ) is a vector of firm characteristics. The magnitude of 2 can be interpreted as trade deflection resulting from the AD duty in country h.
We assume that comprises two components, a permanent firm-product-country component and a transitory component. So, the error term satisfies:
where iid (0, 2 U
) and iid (0, 2 ) are independent of each other. Fixed effects (FE) estimator is one way of estimating eq. (1) because it eliminates time invariant error component, . However, the greatest econometric concern in FE estimation of eq. (1) is that it results in biased and inconsistent estimates associated with the serial correlation of ln ( −1 ) with FE transformed residuals. To remedy this autocorrelation, we first difference eq. (1) and estimate it using the two stage least squares/instrumental variables (IV) approach described in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in which we instrument for using the multiple lags of the levels of this variable. 12, 13 It should be emphasized that there are also two potential problems with the IV estimator used in estimating eq. (2); bias due to the measurement error and bias associated with the use of a weak instrument. If there is measurement error in ln ( ), then the measurement error in the variable, Δln ( −1 ), will be correlated with the measurement error in the instrument, ln ( −2 ) . Therefore, we employ an alternative instrument, ln ( −3 ) , in consideration that its measurement error is not correlated with the measurement error in Δln ( −1 ). 14 In addition, to test the quality of the instrument, we estimate the first-stage model using our instrument. As shown in Table 5 , the F-statistic of 21.65 is larger than the 99 %critical χ 2 (1) of 6.63, which implies that our instruments are strong and IV approach is appropriate for our estimation.
Estimating the eq. (1) using first differences also controls for the firm-level unobservable covariates such as managerial skills, destination country specific time-invariants, such as geography and distance and sectorspecific macro shocks in the export markets.
Exporters are found to be more productive than non-exporters. 15 In line with this, a change in exporter firm's productivity over time might affect the total value of its shipments. Therefore, our policy interactions might capture the effect of a productivity shock at the firm level that would be correlated with the growth in exports. The customs' data does not allow us to control for productivity because it contains no information on domestic sales. However, we control for the size of the firms which is measured by the total number of workers employed within a year. We believe that larger firms tend to be more productive and have higher expected profits from exporting. 16 Moreover, as discussed in Bernard and Jensen (2004) , size may control for several factors; larger firms have lower average and marginal costs, which improve exporting activity, and size is a proxy for past success by definition.
The growth in exports can also partially be explained by macroeconomic factors in the destination market. For instance, trade openness, GDP growth and exchange rate appreciation in a potential export market can work as an import demand shifter that would help exporters deflect their shipments to that destination. In this regard, we use country-year dummies to control for macroeconomic aggregates.
The first column in Table 3 documents the estimates for eq. (1) . Although the policy variable,( ℎ ), has the expected sign, it is not statistically significant. In order to examine whether the previous trading relationships of the firms for the targeted products provides a different outcome in terms of trade deflection, we continue with estimating the following equation: Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market, t is a year. Absolute values of z scores are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % level respectively. All specifications include a constant term which is suppressed. Notes: Global Antidumping Database, SECEX and RAIS. Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market,t is a year. φ denotes the summary statistics only for the unit observations with positive export values. Notes: Subscript f is a firm, p is a 6-digit HS product, i is an export market, t is a year. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % level respectively. All specifications include a constant term which is suppressed.
where 3 is a dummy and unity if the firm in the unit observation was exporting the targeted product to both country i and h before the duty imposition. T3 is non-zero only for the firm-product combinations which are affected by an AD duty in country h. The sum of the coefficient of the policy variable and the interaction term ( 2 + 4 ) can be interpreted as the effect of AD duties on the firms' exports of targeted products to alternative destinations that they were already exporting those products.
Extensive Margin of Trade Defllection
In order to quantify the effect of AD duties on the probability of exporting, we estimate the following probability model:
is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm exports product p to country i in time t and zero otherwise.̇is unity if the firm was previously serving country i in the last three years. 1 takes on a value of 1 if the firm affected by AD duty in h was non-exporter in country i and 2 is 1 if it was not exporter of product p but exporter of another product to country i before the duty imposition. The effect of AD duty on the probability of exporting the duty imposed product is is 2 + 3 for the firm-product duos that are classified as previously non-exporters in country i and is 2 + 4 for the ones that are classified as previously exporters. On the other hand, the coefficient 4 demonstrates the difference in probability of exporting for the previously exporter firm-product duos that experienced AD in an alternative destination compared to those that did not.
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The most important issue in estimation (4) is the influence of unobserved heterogeneity. There might be some permanent firm or product attributes that are correlated with the decision to start exporting a particular product as a result of an AD duty imposed in another destination. This will yield us to overestimate the effect of our policy interactions as these variations are not observed. There are different alternatives to estimate the binary choice model of starting to export a product with unobserved elements including maximum likelihood techniques such as probit or conditional logit, or linear probability model with random or fixed effects. Since the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with our firm specific controls, random effect estimation is not appropriate for our specification.
18 Thus, to model the unobserved heterogeneity as fixed, we choose to use linear probability model with firm-product-destination fixed effects and country-year dummies.
Results
The results derived from estimating eq. (2) are shown in the second column of Table 3 . As opposed to the first specification, the effect of AD duty is significant when it is interacted with the past exporting status (type 3). This suggests that firms begin to increase their shipments to alternative countries that they were already exporting the same product when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination (intensive margin). In terms of the economic interpretation, imposition of a trade restriction in the form of an AD duty on a six-digit HS product results in a 13.1 % ( 2 + 4 =0.031+0.131***) increase in the Brazilian firms' exports of the targeted product to alternative countries where the firms previously exported the same product.
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GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimation is not computationally feasible with a set of fixed effects and country-year dummies, and thus we estimate the model without the latter two and report the results in the third column for comparison. As can be seen, the estimates have larger coefficients. The interaction term falls short of being significant whereby its z score (1.62) is slightly lower than the critical value of the 10 % significance level of 1.64.
The fourth column of Table 3 documents the results for the extensive margin estimation. Similarly, the past exporting statuses of the firms are interacted with the policy variable. As shown, although the interaction of AD duty variable is significant for type 2, the policy variable itself and the type 1 interaction term is insignificant. This suggests that imposition of an AD duty in a particular destination increases the firms' probability of exporting the targeted product in a different destination if the firm already served the market before. On the contrary, we do not observe such a probability increase to the export destinations that firms did not export in the past. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, imposition of an AD duty in a particular destination increases the probability of exporting in a different destination by around 9 % ( 2 + 4 =0.038+0.089***) to the destinations that the firm exported another product before. This magnitude also denotes the difference in the probability of exporting for the previously exporter firm-product duos that experienced AD in an alternative destination ( 1 + 4 =19 %) compared to those that did not ( 1 =10 %).
In conclusion to the extensive margin estimation, the insignificant coefficient of type 1 interaction demonstrates that market specific start-up costs of exporting plays a crucial role in determining the potential export market to deflect trade for the firms whose product suffers an AD duty in a particular destination. This might also be related to the temporary feature of the AD duties. It would be plausible for a targeted firm to deflect its trade to a country they never exported before as a result of a permanent change in a particular country's trade policy. However, the cost of the temporary adjustment in trade policy in the form of an AD duty in an export market does not seem enough to dominate the market specific start-up costs in another destination; although it seems to offset the market-product specific start-up costs.
Conclusion
Trade deflection has become an important issue in the WTO and other Customs Unions' framework. From China specific safeguards to intra-regional trade protocols, there are many examples of policy debates regarding this issue.
20 This paper represents the first attempt to utilize a rich four dimensional customs data (firm-productdestination-year) to analyze the effect of past exporting relationships on trade deflection resulting from AD duties that targets Brazilian exported products. Our key finding is that firms only deflect exports to countries where they have an already established trading relationship. In particular, we find that, on the intensive margin, firms increase their export by around 13 % to alternative countries in which they were already exporting the targeted product when they suffer an AD duty in a particular export destination. On the extensive margin, our findings suggest that firms' probability of exporting the duty imposed product to a different market increases only if they have already an established trading relationship in that market. In contrast, we find no significant effect of AD duties on the firms' probability of exporting the particular product in different export destinations that the firm did not export in the past. In addition to making sense of existing puzzles in trade deflection, this paper makes an important contribution by demonstrating how much the fixed costs of developing an export destination matter in terms of trade deflection.
Our paper also paves the way for a more detailed exploration of trade deflection using the firm-level data to better understand the trading effects of AD practices not only for the duty imposer and the targeted country but also for the third-party countries that are not named in the investigations. In addition, we also point out a new view to examine the relationship between trade deflection and the spread of worldwide AD filings. We believe that researchers and policy makers should focus more on exporting firms' past trading relationships when evaluating the threat of trade deflection in the World trading system.
21
Another related question regarding our paper is whether the targeted firms switch exported products in the duty imposer country when they deflect their trade to different destinations or whether the imposition of an AD duty in a country affects the firms' exports of another product, rather than the targeted one, because of trade deflection. While our focus in this paper is the effect of past trading relationships on trade deflection, analyzing the trading effects of AD in terms of these related topics is an attractive avenue for future research.
